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INTRODUCTION 
If a man is hot on a summer’s day in Los Angeles1 or Newport Beach,2 
California, he could simply take his shirt off to help him cool down. When he does 
this, no one would even bat an eyelash. On that same day, on that same street, a 
woman would be guilty of a misdemeanor, fined and possibly jailed, for doing the 
exact same thing. Laws discriminating on the basis of a woman’s anatomy bear no 
relationship to a woman’s capabilities or role in society; they merely subjugate her 
to a second-class citizenship solely because of the way society sexualizes her body. 
In order to defend prohibitions on general, public female toplessness, 
proponents equate it to nude or topless dancing and import the same justifications 
to ban it.3 For example, the Newport Beach City Council declared that the intent of 
its public nudity ordinance is “to eliminate . . . the secondary effects associated with 
the presentation of nudity in adult-oriented establishments.”4 This false equivalence 
codifies the fetishization of a woman’s body into law and leads to an absurd result. 
This reasoning rests on the faulty premise that the two acts are essentially 
interchangeable and share the same purpose. It follows that any time a woman is 
topless in public she is doing it solely to attract attention and making her body a 
constant spectacle for the public’s enjoyment and sexual pleasure. This reasoning 
neglects the multitude of benign reasons why a woman would want to be topless in 
public, such as to cool off, to avoid tan lines, or to feel free from the encumbrances 
of straps and bands. 
Female topless prohibitions are the embodiment of gender discrimination. It 
is one of the remaining laws that blatantly treat men and women differently on the 
basis of how society views their bodies and the biological differences between the 
sexes. Paternalistic notions that a woman needs the laws to protect her from a man’s 
gaze and his uncontrollable desire to touch her if he sees her bare chest undermine 
the struggle for gender equality. It is a modern example that a woman’s body is 
deemed lesser than a man’s. The justifications for these laws are faulty and based 
on flawed logic that can be traced from the Women’s Suffrage movement in 
England and America in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to the 
2016 election. This Note will show that there is no important governmental 
objective that justifies making it a crime for a woman to be topless in public, just as 
there was no important objective that justifies prohibiting women from voting, 
becoming a lawyer, attending a prestigious military academy, or fighting in the 
military. 
 
1. L.A., CAL., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 17.04.480 (1971). 
2. NEWPORT BEACH, CAL., MUN. CODE § 10.54.010–030 (1975). 
3. See City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 283–84 (2000) (upholding a Pennsylvania public 
nudity ordinance); Barnes v. Glen Theatre Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991) (holding that an Indiana public 
indecency law that required nude dancers to wear pasties and a G-string did not violate the First 
Amendment). 
4. NEWPORT BEACH, CAL., MUN. CODE § 10.54.010–030 (1975). 
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In Part I, this Note examines the Constitutional implications of female 
toplessness laws. More specifically, it demonstrates how female toplessness laws 
ought to fail under an Equal Protection framework and illustrates why the First 
Amendment has been incorrectly applied to general toplessness. In Part II, this 
Note will argue that many of the justifications proponents set forth, based on 
protecting morality, public order, and ending sexual violence against women, are 
irrelevant to the issue of topless female sunbathing, and provide no valid 
justifications for these laws. Further, in Part III, this Note will analyze other 
arguments in favor of lifting these bans, including the negative effects these laws 
have on men and women. Finally, in Part IV, the Note will conclude with 
illustrations of some ways society has already demonstrated a willingness to 
liberalize these laws and its perceptions of women’s bodies. 
I. FEMALE TOPLESSNESS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL UNDERPINNING 
The foundation of gender equality is to ensure that men and women enjoy the 
same rights and opportunities across all sectors of society. It means that rights, 
responsibilities, and opportunities will not depend on whether a person is born male 
or female.5 Banning a woman from being topless limits her rights, not just based on 
her gender, but also based on how society views her gender. In order for women to 
achieve total equality in America, society must view all gendered bodies on equal 
footing. Men and women are already not allowed to show their genitalia,6 but only 
women are not allowed to be topless in public. 
A. Equal Protection Doctrine 
Sex is an immutable characteristic determined by accident of birth. As such, 
the Supreme Court has held that any law that is based on a discriminatory 
classification, must “at least … serve[ ] important governmental objectives and  
[ ] the discriminatory means employed [must be] substantially related to the 
achievement of those objectives.”7 Female toplessness laws are a modern-day 
example of intentional discrimination by the government based on traditional 
(sexist) notions of women in society. However, the Supreme Court has consistently 
ruled that traditional notions of sex cannot be used to justify a discriminatory law.8 
The imposition of special disabilities upon the members of a particular sex “because 
of their sex would seem to violate ‘the basic concept of our system that legal burdens 
 
5. Gender Mainstreaming, EUR. INST. FOR GENDER EQUALITY, http://eige.europa.eu/
gender-mainstreaming/concepts-and-definitions [ https://perma.cc/FJB2-MGKV ]  ( last visited June 
3, 2018). 
6. See L.A., CAL., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 17.04.480 (1971); NEWPORT BEACH, CAL., 
MUN. CODE § 10.54.010–030 (1975). 
7. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (quoting Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 
458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
8. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (invalidating a law based on the traditional view 
that men were more qualified to administer estates than women). The Supreme Court in Reed and its 
progeny slowly chipped away at the belief that men are more capable than women. 
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should bear some relationship to individual responsibility.’”9 Therefore, they must 
be deemed unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment. Sadly, this has not 
been the case. Courts too often find governmental reliance on incorrect 
descriptions and false analogies—that women’s bodies are sexual and comparable 
to one’s genitalia.10 
Female toplessness laws are an unjustifiable burden on women and bear no 
justification in sound legal or societal principles. The common justifications for 
these laws are based on antiquated Victorian and Judeo-Christian values that have 
no place in our modern society.11 These laws are rationalized “by an attitude of 
‘romantic paternalism’ which, in practical effect, put women, not on a pedestal, but 
in a cage.”12 These laws find their origin in an era when women were legal second-
class citizens, whose “paramount destiny and mission . . . [were] to fulfill the noble 
and benign offices of wife and mother”13 and whose value was dictated on whether 
they were chaste and modest. Women could not vote;14 women could not be heirs;15 
women could not hold public office16 or be on juries;17 women could not bring 
lawsuits in their own names.18 Married women were not even able to serve as legal 
guardians of their own children19 and many were obligated to relinquish control of 
 
9. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (quoting Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety 
Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972)). 
10. See discussion infra Section II.C. 
11. Sara Sheridan, Toplessnes - The One Victorian Taboo That Won’t Go Away, BBC NEWS 
ONLINE, Nov. 15, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-30052071 [ https://perma.cc/FT2D-
LFVW]. 
12. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 684. 
13. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1873) (Bradley, J., concurring). 
14. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIX; Suffrage Wins in Senate; Now Goes to States, N.Y. TIMES,  
June 5, 1919; see also Susan B. Anthony, On Women’s Right to Vote (1873) (transcript available 
at DIGITAL HIST., http://www.digitalhistory.uh.edu/disp_textbook.cfm?smtid=3&psid=3604 
[ https://perma.cc/BE5E-52US] ( last visited June 3, 2018)). 
15. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (overturning Idaho code that stated that “[o]f several 
persons claiming equally entitled . . . to administer [the estate of one who dies intestate], males must be 
preferred to females . . . .”); cf. Thomas Edgar, The Law’s Resolutions of Women’s Rights; Or, the Law’s 
Provision for Women, in NORTON ANTHOLOGY OF ENGLISH LITERATURE: EARLY SEVENTEENTH 
CENTURY TOPICS 26, 30 (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES (1765)) (noting that, 
uncommonly, “[s]ome seventeenth-century men did . . . respect[ ] their [wives’] claims to inherited 
estates”). 
16. In 1949, Margaret Chase Smith became the first woman elected to the U.S. Senate  
without previously being appointed to the office or filling a vacancy by the death of her  
husband. See Smith, Margaret Chase, HIST., ARTS, & ARCHIVES: U.S. HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES,  
http://history.house.gov/People/Detail/21866 [ https://perma.cc/MM2X-CKA9] ( last visited June 
3, 2018). 
17. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975) (prohibiting states from systematically 
excluding women from jury service). 
18.  Edgar, supra note 15. 
19. Harvard Bus. Sch., Women and the Law, WOMEN, ENTERPRISE & SOC’Y,  
http://www.library.hbs.edu/hc/wes/collections/women_law/ [ https://perma.cc/EQ3P-TBPP] 
( last visited June 3, 2018). 
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their property and earnings to their husbands.20 It is no surprise, then, that women 
could not be topless in public.21 
1. The Evolution of the Doctrine 
The Supreme Court’s recognition of gender as a suspect classification arose 
out of the women’s movement of the 1960s. By questioning the social and legal 
understandings of the gendered divide, the women’s movement of the 1960s gave 
rise to many of the key protections women enjoy today. It is with this backdrop that 
Congress enacted key legislation prohibiting sex discrimination22 and the Senate 
passed the Equal Rights Amendment (the “ERA”) on March 22, 1972.23 Further, a 
unanimous Supreme Court held that statutory classifications on the basis of gender 
are “subject to scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause” of the Fourteenth 
Amendment,24 reversing nearly a century’s old practice of refusing to extend the 
protections of the Fourteenth Amendment to women.25 
Between 1971 and 1976, the Supreme Court fundamentally altered its 
treatment of gender discrimination. Starting with Reed v. Reed and Frontiero  
v. Richardson in 1971 and 1973, respectfully, and ending with Craig v. Boren in 1976, 
the Court laid the foundation for the gender discrimination jurisprudence that it still 
relies on today. Prior to these cases, the Court had consistently relied on social and 
biological differences between men and women to justify discriminatory treatment 
under the law.26 In Reed v. Reed, a husband and wife conflicted over who could  
be the administrator of the estate of their deceased son.27 At the time, Idaho  
Probate Code specified that “males must be preferred to females” in appointed 
 
20. Mary Beth Norton, “Either Married Or to Bee Married”: Women’s Legal Equality in Early 
America, in INEQUALITY IN EARLY AMERICA 29, 34 (Carla Gardina Pestana & Sharon V. Salinger eds., 
1999); see also Edgar, supra note 15. 
21. For much of American history, women were subject to social ridicule for wearing trousers. 
See Nora Caplan-Bricker, Women Who Wear Pants: Still Somehow Controversial, SLATE (Feb. 16, 2016, 
2:27 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/double_x/doublex/2016/02/women_wearing_pants_ 
are_still_controversial.html [ https://perma.cc/RE5V-QCJF]. 
22. Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703, 78 Stat. 241, 255–57 (codified 
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17); see also Education Amendments of 1972,  
Pub. L. No. 92-318, § 901, 86 Stat. 235, 335, 373–74 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1688); 
Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 13, 86 Stat. 816, 903 
(codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1376); Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972,  
Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 2, 86 Stat. 103, 103 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. §§ 
2000e to 2000e-17); State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-512, § 122, 86  
Stat. 919, 932; Nurses Training Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-158, § 11, 85 Stat. 465, 479–80; 
Comprehensive Health Manpower Training Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-157, § 110, 85 Stat. 431, 461. 
23. Eileen Shanahan, Equal Rights Amendment Is Approved by Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 
1972, at A1. 
24. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75 (1971). 
25. See, e.g., Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 138–39 (1873) (declining to extend to women the 
right to obtain a license to practice law under the Fourteenth Amendment). 
26. See, e.g., id. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring) (“The natural and proper timidity and delicacy 
which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life.”). 
27. Reed, 404 U.S. at 71–72. 
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administrators of estates.28 In striking down the law, Chief Justice Burger applied 
the test for non-gender-based Equal Protection challenges: “A classification ‘must 
be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having 
a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons 
similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.’”29 The Court declared the statute’s 
preference “arbitrary” and a distinction that could not “stand in the face of the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s command that no State deny the equal protection of the 
laws to any person within its jurisdiction.”30 
The Court expanded its protections in Frontiero where eight Justices held that 
classifications based on gender are inherently invidious and are unconstitutional.31 
The Court struck down a law that required female military personnel to prove 
dependency on their husbands in order to receive benefits; the law assumed 
dependency of wives for male military personnel.32 The law, it found, was based on 
the “long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination . . . [that] in practical effect, 
put women, not on a pedestal, but in a cage.”33 However, the Court could not agree 
on the level of judicial scrutiny that this classification warranted. The plurality, 
penned by Justice Brennan, held that such classification was “inherently suspect,” 
on par with race and national origin, and subject to “strict judicial scrutiny.” 34 The 
concurrence, by Justice Powell, disagreed saying it is “unnecessary … to 
characterize sex as a suspect class”35 and instead, found solace in Reed and the 
ERA.36 
The Court settled on a level of scrutiny three years later in Craig v. Boren.37 
Unfortunately, Justice Brennan writing this time for the majority had forsaken the 
 
28. Id. at 73. 
29. Id. at 76 (quoting Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)). 
30. Id. at 74. 
31. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686–87, 690 (1973) (Brennan, J.) (plurality opinion) 
(“As a result, statutory distinctions between the sexes often have the effect of invidiously relegating the 
entire class of females to inferior legal status without regard to the actual capabilities of its individual 
members.”); id. at 691 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 691–92 (Powell, J., concurring). 
32. Id. at 678–79. 
33. Id. at 684. 
34. Id. at 688 (Brennan, J.) (plurality opinion) (“With these considerations in mind, we can only 
conclude that classifications based upon sex, like classifications based upon race, alienage, or national 
origin, are inherently suspect, and must therefore be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny. Applying the 
analysis mandated by that stricter standard of review, it is clear that the statutory scheme now before 
us is constitutionally invalid.”). 
35. Id. at 691 (Powell, J., concurring). 
36. Id. at 692 (noting that the ERA is a compelling reason to defer invoking strict scrutiny 
because “. . . if adopted [it] will resolve the substance of this precise question.” He continued that “this 
reaching out to pre-empt by judicial action a major political decision [ratifying the ERA] which is 
currently in process of resolution does not reflect appropriate respect for duly prescribed legislative 
processes.”). While at the time this opinion was published in May of 1973, thirty states had already 
ratified the ERA, ultimately it fell just three states shy of the requisite three-fourths. See Roberta  
W. Francis, Ratification: State Ratification of the ERA, THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT: 
UNFINISHED BUSINESS FOR THE CONSTITUTION, http://www.equalrightsamendment.org/
ratification.htm [ https://perma.cc/7HDP-DHRK] ( last visited June 3, 2018). 
37. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
First to Printer_Alisobhani (Do Not Delete) 8/30/2018  10:41 AM 
2018] FEMALE TOPLESSNESS 305 
standard of “strict judicial scrutiny”38 from Frontiero in favor of an “elevated or 
‘intermediate’ level scrutiny.’”39 In Craig, the Court struck down an Oklahoma 
statute that prohibited certain types of beer to be sold to men under the age of 
twenty-one and women under the age of eighteen.40 The Court articulated the 
following test, based on Reed and its progeny: “To withstand constitutional 
challenge [under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment] 
classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must 
be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.”41 Applying this test, the 
Court held that the law “invidiously discriminate[d] against males 18–20 years of 
age” and that the State failed to show that “sex represent[ed] a legitimate, accurate 
proxy for the regulation of drinking and driving.”42 
2. The Doctrine Today 
The modern Equal Protection doctrine’s intermediate scrutiny standard has 
been clarified in two recent cases: Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan43 and 
United States v. Virginia.44 Although recent decisions have not truly honored this 
new standard,45 it is important to consider as this still remains good law.46 
 
38. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 688. 
39. Craig, 429 U.S. at 218 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (describing the majority’s test); id. at 210, 
n.* (Powell, J., concurring) (articulating that the test will be viewed as a “middle-tier” because it is more 
demanding than rational basis, and less demanding than strict scrutiny). 
40. Id. at 191–92. 
41. Id. at 197–99 (Brennan, J.); see also id. at 210 n.* (Powell, J., concurring). 
42. Id. at 204. 
43. Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 718 (1982). 
44. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 515 (1996). 
45. See Virginia Milstead, Forbidding Female Toplessness: Why “Real Difference” Jurisprudence 
Lacks “Support” and What Can Be Done About it, 36 U. TOL. L. REV. 273, 314–18 (2005) (arguing that 
the Virginia standard has largely been ignored); see also Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt,  
136 S. Ct. 2292, 2327 (2016) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The illegitimacy of using ‘made up tests’ to 
‘displace longstanding national traditions as the primary determinant of what the Constitution means’ 
has long been apparent.”) (quoting Virginia, 518 U.S. at 570 (Scalia, J., dissenting)). Compare Nguyen  
v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 533 U.S. 53, 70 (2001) (applying Virginia in name only, while 
effectively applying the traditional version of intermediate scrutiny), with id. at 88–89 (O’Connor,  
J., dissenting) (arguing that the INS has not shown an exceedingly persuasive justification for the sex-
based classification because the court did not adequately consider the effectiveness of a gender-neutral 
law). 
46. Many federal courts of appeals, including the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, continue to 
apply Virginia’s heightened scrutiny test for sex-discrimination. See, e.g., Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 
137 S. Ct. 1678 (2017); Morales-Santana v. Lynch, 804 F.3d 520, 528–30 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 136 
S. Ct. 2545 (2016), and aff’d in part, rev’d in part and remanded sub nom; Associated Gen. Contractors 
of Am., San Diego Chapter, Inc. v. Cal. Dep’t of Transp., 713 F.3d 1187, 1195 (9th Cir. 2013);  
Cmtys. for Equity v. Mich. High Sch. Ath. Ass’n, 459 F.3d 676, 693–95 (6th Cir. 2006); Hibbs v. Dep’t 
of Human Res., 273 F.3d 844, 854 (9th Cir. 2001); Monterey Mech. Co. v. Wilson, 125 F.3d 702, 712–
15 (9th Cir. 1997). In the Ninth Circuit, only Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. has applied the 
“exceedingly persuasive justification” analysis at the court of appeals level; however, many Ninth 
Circuit district courts have. See, e.g., Sassman v. Brown, 99 F. Supp. 3d 1223, 1234 (E.D. Cal. 2015), 
appeal dismissed (Mar. 14, 2016), modified on reconsideration, No. 214CV01679MCEKJN, 2015 WL 
8780632 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2015); Latta v. Otter, 19 F. Supp. 3d 1054, 1073 (D. Idaho 2014). 
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In Mississippi University for Women, the Court stated that: 
Although the test for determining the validity of a gender-based 
classification is straightforward, it must be applied free of fixed notions 
concerning the roles and abilities of males and females. Care must be taken 
in ascertaining whether the statutory objective itself reflects archaic and 
stereotypic notions. Thus, if the statutory objective is to exclude or 
“protect” members of one gender because they are presumed to suffer 
from an inherent handicap or to be innately inferior, the objective itself is 
illegitimate.47 
The Court used this test to strike down the Mississippi University for Women’s 
single-sex admissions policy.48 As a result of their discriminatory admissions policy, 
the university would not admit a male nursing student applicant who was otherwise 
qualified, solely because he was male.49 
The pivotal case of the modern era regarding gender equality is Virginia.50 In 
this 1996 decision, the Court with a seven-to-one opinion heightened the standard 
for gender discrimination to “skeptical scrutiny” when it found Virginia Military 
Institute’s exclusively male admissions policy unconstitutional under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.51 By requiring that the government show an “exceedingly persuasive 
justification,” the court imposed a stricter standard than intermediate scrutiny. The 
Court declared: “State actors controlling the gates of opportunity … may not 
exclude qualified individuals based on ‘fixed notions concerning the roles and 
abilities of males and females.’”52 
Under the new “skeptical scrutiny”53 standard, the party seeking to defend a 
classification must show “at least that the [challenged] classification serves 
 
47. Miss. Univ. for Women, 458 U.S. at 724–25 (citing Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 
684–85 (1973)). 
48. Id. at 731: 
Thus, considering both the asserted interest and the relationship between the interest and 
the methods used by the State, we conclude that the State has fallen far short of establishing 
the “exceedingly persuasive justification” needed to sustain the gender-based classification. 
Accordingly, we hold that MUW’s policy of denying males the right to enroll for credit in its 
School of Nursing violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
49. Id. at 720–21. 
50. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515. 
51. Id. at 534: 
Measuring the record in this case against the review standard just described, we conclude 
that Virginia has shown no “exceedingly persuasive justification” for excluding all women 
from the citizen-soldier training afforded by VMI. We therefore affirm the Fourth Circuit’s 
initial judgment, which held that Virginia had violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal 
Protection Clause. 
52. Id. at 541 (quoting Miss. Univ. for Women, 458 U.S. at 725). 
53. Id. at 531: 
   We note, once again, the core instruction of this Court’s pathmarking decisions in  
J. E. B. v. Alabama ex rel. T. B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994), and Mississippi Univ. for Women, 458 
U.S. at 724 (internal quotation marks omitted): Parties who seek to defend gender-based 
government action must demonstrate an ‘exceedingly persuasive justification’ for that 
action. 
First to Printer_Alisobhani (Do Not Delete) 8/30/2018  10:41 AM 
2018] FEMALE TOPLESSNESS 307 
‘important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed’ 
are ‘substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.’”54 The Court 
declared that, in order for an objective to be sufficient, “[t]he justification must be 
genuine, not hypothesized or invented post hoc in response to litigation. And it must 
not rely on overbroad generalizations about the different talents, capacities, or 
preferences of males and females.”55 Many courts continue to follow these criteria 
in order to determine whether an interest can justify the sex discrimination.56 
B. First Amendment 
“Being ‘in a state of nudity’ is not an inherently expressive condition.”57 Under 
the Court’s declaration it would follow that the First Amendment is generally 
inapplicable in instances of toplessness for toplessness’ sake because general 
toplessness is not expressive conduct, but it would protect topless protesting which 
is expressive. And yet, that is not the case in the majority of decisions.58 Perhaps 
 
   Today’s skeptical scrutiny of official action denying rights or opportunities based on 
sex responds to volumes of history. 
Id. 
54. Id. at 533 (quoting Miss. Univ. for Women, 458 U.S. at 724 (quoting Wengler v. Druggists  
Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150 (1980))). 
55. Id. (“The justification must be genuine, not hypothesized or invented post hoc in response 
to litigation. And it must not rely on overbroad generalizations about the different talents, capacities, 
or preferences of males and females.”) (citing Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 643, 648 (1975); 
Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 223–24 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment)). 
56. Associated Gen. Contrs. of Am. v. Cal. Dept. of Transp., 713 F.3d 1187, 1195 (9th  
Cir. 2013); Cmtys. for Equity v. Mich. High Sch. Ath. Ass’n, 459 F.3d 676, 695 (6th Cir. 2006); Morales-
Santana v. Lynch, 804 F.3d 521, 528–30 (2d Cir. 2006); Hibbs v. Dep’t of Human Res., 273 F.3d 844, 
854 (9th Cir. 2001); Monterey Mech. Co. v. Wilson, 125 F.3d 702, 712–16 (9th Cir. 1997); Sassman  
v. Brown, 99 F. Supp. 3d 1223 (E.D. Cal. 2015); Latta v. Otter, 19 F. Supp. 3d 1054 (D. Idaho, 2014). 
57. City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 289 (2000) (citing Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 
U.S. 560, 565–66 (1991) (plurality opinion); Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 66 
(1981)). 
58. See Craft v. Hodel, 683 F. Supp. 289, 291 (D. Mass. 1988) (rejecting the argument “that [the 
plaintiffs’] message of protest against exploitation is conveyed particularly by their nudity” and finding 
that “this is only a matter of perspective” because “public nudity does not convey any specific message, 
at most it is a medium by which a variety of messages may be conveyed”); Free the Nipple—Fort 
Collins v. City of Fort Collins, 216 F. Supp. 3d 1258 (D. Colo. 2016) (granting City of Fort Collins’ 
motion to dismiss in part with regards to plaintiffs’ First Amendment claim but otherwise denying it); 
Free the Nipple—Fort Collins v. City of Fort Collins, 237 F. Supp. 3d 1126 (D. Colo. 2017) (granting 
preliminary injunction on Equal Protection Claim). But see People v. Craft, 509 N.Y.S.2d 1005, 1007, 
1012 (N.Y. City Ct. 1986) (finding that a New York public exposure penal statute was not 
unconstitutional as applied to a group of women who went topless in a New York park to protest the 
state’s public exposure law), rev’d 564 N.Y.S.2d 695 (1991); People v. Craft, 564 N.Y.S.2d 695 (1991), 
rev’d sub nom. People v. Santorelli, 600 N.E.2d 232 (N.Y. 1992). The court also justified the 
discriminatory treatment under the Equal Protection Clause: 
The State of course may treat males and females differently and not violate the Equal 
Protection Clauses of the United States and New York State Constitutions provided the 
unequal treatment is substantially related to the achievement of an important governmental 
concern. (Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982)). This court finds 
that the State’s objective in the passage of this statute is to protect the public from invasions 
of its sensibilities and that it currently reflects community standards as to what constitutes 
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because the same rules prohibit both forms of toplessness, both are prohibited. It 
is also because courts fail to view a woman’s breasts as anything but a sexual object 
that it must protect society against. Even when the conduct is expressive, courts 
have used this reasoning to uphold female toplessness prohibitions like in the nude 
and topless dancing context59 and also when it is not expressive (or when they deem 
it non-expressive), like topless protesting. As a result, it is necessary to analyze the 
ways the First Amendment has affected female toplessness.60 While there are some 
courts that have protected female toplessness through the First Amendment, more 
often than not, general toplessness gets lumped into the same category as nude 
dancing and thus deemed “obscene,”61 or found not to be expressive and thus not 
protected. 
1. Expressive Conduct 
The right to free speech is one of the fundamental tenets of our modern 
society.62 The First Amendment states: “Congress shall make no law … abridging 
the freedom of speech, or of the press … .”63 It prohibits the government from 
restricting expression, but it is not limitless prohibition. The Supreme Court’s First 
Amendment jurisprudence establishes that there are permissible restrictions on 
speech. The First Amendment also protects speech when it is not on oratory or on 
a page. 
In United States v. O’Brien, the Supreme Court recognized that communicative 
conduct is not immune from government regulation.64 David Paul O’Brien burned 
his Selective Services registration certificate in protest of the Vietnam War in 
violation of federal law.65 As a result, he was indicted, convicted, and sentenced.66 
O’Brien brought suit arguing that his conviction and the federal law violated the 
 
nudity. As such, the prohibition under the statute as it applies to women is substantially 
related to the achievement of an important governmental interest or concern. 
Craft, 564 N.Y.S.2d at 697. 
However, it is important to note that this case was decided before Virginia, thus it is possible that the 
court may have ruled the other way as a result of the stricter standard. See Reena Glazer, Note, Women’s 
Body Image and the Law, 43 DUKE L.J. 113, 122–30 (1993). 
59. By this, I mean nude dancing, where toplessness is also prohibited. See Barnes, 501 U.S. at 
565 (holding that an Indiana public indecency law that required nude dancers to wear pasties and a G-
string did not violate the First Amendment); California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109 (1972) (upholding a 
California Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control regulation prohibiting nude dancing in places in 
establishments licensed to sell alcohol as valid under the First Amendment). 
60. See also Brenna Helppie-Schmieder, Note, The Constitution and Societal Norms: A Modern 
Case for Female Breast Equality, 5 DEPAUL J. WOMEN, GENDER & L. 1, 14–17 (2015); Danielle 
Moriber, Note, A Right to Bare All? Female Public Toplessness and Dealing with the Laws that Prohibit, 8 
CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 453, 469 (2009). 
61. See discussion infra Part I.B.2. 
62. See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1237–38 (5th ed. 2017). 
63. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
64. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
65. Id. at 369. It was unlawful to knowingly destroy one’s Selective Service registration card 
under 50 U.S.C. § 462(b) (current version at 50 U.S.C. § 3811(b) (2015)). See O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 370. 
66. O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 369. 
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First Amendment. The Court did not agree,67 laying out the following test for 
symbolic conduct: 
[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the 
constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or 
substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated 
to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on 
alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the 
furtherance of that interest.68  
The Court found that the government’s prohibition was “an appropriately 
narrow means of protecting”69 its interest in maintaining a smooth functioning draft 
system. It further justified O’Brien’s conviction “because the noncommunicative 
impact of O’Brien’s act of burning his registration certificate frustrated the 
Government’s interest.”70 
The Supreme Court applied O’Brien to nude dancing vis-à-vis its 
communication of “an erotic message.”71 In Barnes v. Glen Theatre Inc., the Court 
noted that because nude dancing “is expressive conduct within the outer perimeters 
of the First Amendment,”72 it is afforded some protections under the First 
Amendment, but that some types of nude dancing may be regulated and are not 
protected.73 Applying the four-part O’Brien test, the Court upheld an Indiana statute 
that proscribed all instances of public nudity. The Court found that the law furthers 
a substantial interest in “protecting societal order and morality.”74 The Court went 
further to note that since public nudity is the evil the State seeks to prevent, the fact 
that the law may have implications on expression is only incidental and not a cause 
to strike it down.75 
The blanket prohibitions in these ordinances fail the “greater than is 
essential”76 test in O’Brien. Under this test, the ordinances are inherently overbroad 
because they impose restrictions that are greater than is essential to further a 
substantial government interest such as protecting children. The blanket 
prohibitions neglect the fact that there are valid circumstances where it should be 
 
67. Id. at 386. 
68. Id. at 377. See also CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 
1119 (5th ed. 2015) (noting that the standard is very similar to the intermediate scrutiny standard); 
Moriber, supra note 60, at 475. 
69. O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 382. 
70. Id. 
71. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 560 (1991). 
72. Id. at 566. 
73. Id. at 565–66. 
74. Id. at 568–69 (citing Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 61 (1973) (“[T]his Court 
implicitly accepted that a legislature could legitimately act on such a conclusion to protect ‘the social 
interest in order and morality.’”) (emphasis omitted) and Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) 
(“The law, however, is constantly based on notions of morality, and if all laws representing essentially 
moral choices are to be invalidated under the Due Process Clause, the courts will be very busy 
indeed.”)). 
75. Id. at 570. 
76. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). 
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acceptable for an adult female to determine that it will not be offensive for her to 
be topless. Yet, these ordinances impose a blanket prohibition on public toplessness 
altogether. Furthermore, these ordinances forget to consider alternative, less 
restrictive, means to further its interests, such as to prohibit the time or place a 
woman can be topless, like a children’s playground. 
2. Nude Dancing, Sexual Speech, and Obscenity 
Just as the First Amendment does not protect all instances of nude dancing,77 
it does not protect obscenity.78 However, it may protect depictions of sex as the 
court has noted how “sex and obscenity are not synonymous.”79 “Obscene material 
is material which deals with sex in a manner appealing to prurient interest[;]” it is 
not simply the portrayal of sex.80 The difference between sex and obscenity is laid 
out by the following test: 
(a) whether “the average person, applying contemporary community 
standards” would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the 
prurient interest; 
(b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, 
sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and 
(c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, 
political, or scientific value.81 
The Court’s treatment of nude dancing, sex, and obscenity are best evinced in 
three cases: Roth v. United States, Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton, and Erie v. Pap’s A.M.82 
In Roth, the Court acknowledged that a legislature could legitimately act to 
protect ”the social interest in order and morality.”83 The Court furthered this 
reasoning in Paris Adult Theatre to recognize that states have a legitimate interest in 
regulating the commerce of obscene material in places of public accommodations.84 
 
77. Compare California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 118–19 (1972) (holding that the California 
Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control could regulate nude dancing in places that sell liquor), and 
Barnes, 501 U.S. at 560 (holding that the State government may ban nude dancing entirely), with Schad 
v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 66 (1981) (finding a municipal ordinance that prohibited 
all live entertainment in a commercial area was unconstitutionally overbroad). 
78. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484–85 (1957) (“[I ]mplicit in the history of the First 
Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social importance. . . . We hold 
that obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press.”); see also Miller  
v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 36–37 (1973) (reaffirming that obscene material is not protected by the First 
Amendment and remanding to determine whether mass mailings depicting sexually explicit material are 
obscene and not protected by the First Amendment); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973) 
(holding that states have the power to make laws prohibiting obscenity; upholding a Georgia obscenity 
law that prohibits the showing of pornographic films). 
79. Roth, 354 U.S. at 487. 
80. Id. 
81. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24 (citations omitted). 
82. See Roth, 354 U.S. 476; Paris Adult Theatre I, 413 U.S. 49; City of Erie v. Pap’s  
A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000). 
83. Roth, 354 U.S. at 485 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)). 
84. Paris Adult Theatre I, 413 U.S. at 69. 
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However, the Court limited a state’s power to censor “obscene” material to 
“depiction[s] and description[s] of specifically defined sexual conduct … .”85 In 
Paris Adult Theatre, the Court stated that: “The States have the power to make a 
morally neutral judgment that public exhibition of obscene material, or commerce 
in such material, has a tendency to injure the community as a whole, to endanger 
the public safety, or to jeopardize, in Mr. Chief Justice Warren’s words, the States’ 
‘right … to maintain a decent society.’”86 Finally, in Erie, the Court upheld an 
ordinance passed by the city of Erie, Pennsylvania requiring live dancers to wear at 
least “pasties” and a “G-string.”87 The city adopted the ordinance “for the purpose 
of limiting a recent increase in nude live entertainment within the City, which 
activity adversely impacts and threatens to impact on the public health, safety and 
welfare by providing an atmosphere conducive to violence, sexual harassment, 
public intoxication, prostitution, the spread of sexually transmitted diseases and 
other deleterious effects.”88 A plurality found that the ordinance was justified to 
combat nude dancing’s “secondary effects.” The court found that nude dancing is 
expressive conduct that is subject to the First Amendment but that being “in a state 
of nudity” is not an inherently expressive condition.89 
The Supreme Court has made it clear that nudity alone is not enough to make 
speech unprotected.90 Unfortunately, lower courts have not followed this reasoning. 
II. BREAKING [DOWN] THE OPPOSITION 
In Virginia, the Court recognized that while diversity in education may be a 
noble justification, it is not a sufficient justification for the sex-based discrimination 
 
85. Id. 
86. Id. (quoting Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 199 (1964) (Warren, C.J., dissenting)). 
87. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. at 291, 296 (2000) (upholding a Pennsylvania public nudity ordinance): 
   We conclude that the [City’s] asserted interest in combatting the negative secondary 
effects associated with adult entertainment establishments . . . is unrelated to the suppression 
of the erotic message conveyed by nude dancing. 
   . . . The asserted interests of regulating conduct through a public nudity ban and of 
combating the harmful secondary effects associated with nude dancing are undeniably 
important. 
Id. at 296. 
88. Id. at 290 (citing Pap’s A.M. v. City of Erie, 553 Pa. 348, 359 (1998), rev’d, 529 U.S. 277 
(2000)). 
89. Id. at 289. 
90. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 207, 213 (1975) (declaring unconstitutional 
an ordinance that prohibits the exhibition of any motion picture “in which the human male or female 
bare buttocks, human female bare breasts, or human bare pubic areas are shown if such motion 
picture . . . is visible from any public street or public place.”): 
[A]ll nudity cannot be deemed obscene, even as to minors. Nor can such a broad restriction 
be justified by any other governmental interest pertaining to minors. Speech that is  
neither obscene as to youths nor subject to some other legitimate proscription cannot be 
suppressed solely to protect the young from ideas or images that a legislative body thinks 
unsuitable . . . . 
Id. at 213 (citation omitted). See also Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 66 (1981) 
(“[N]ude dancing is not without its First Amendment protections from official regulations.”). 
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in Virginia’s Military School.91 Similarly, while ending sexual violence and 
promoting public morality may be valid justifications to prohibit nude dancing, they 
are not substantially related to the prohibition on topless sunbathing. Unlike nude 
dancing, which is done for the express purpose of a performance and in many 
instances to sexually gratify an audience, the act of being topless or topless 
sunbathing has no relation to an intended audience. 
The arguments in favor discussed below are based on the most commonly-
cited reasons to ban female toplessness, based on the cases that have upheld female 
topless prohibitions, including nude dancing prohibitions, as well as in the text of 
some of the ordinances.92 The main justifications for female toplessness include the 
need to preserve public order and morality, to combat sexual violence, and that 
women’s breasts are different than men’s. 
Last, critics and advocates of female toplessness have largely focused on the 
women who are affected by these laws. However, these laws also harm men. Since 
many of the Court’s principal gender discrimination decisions involve suits brought 
by men,93 this Part will also explore some of the arguments men can raise in order 
to challenge these laws. These laws perpetuate a negative stereotype of men: that 
they become vulgar, thuggish, sadistic monsters at the sight of a woman’s flesh. The 
underlying rationale behind the justification of combatting sexual violence is 
precisely if men were able to control themselves, then women would not need to 
cover up.94 
 
91. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 534 n.80 (1996). 
92. See, e.g., NEWPORT BEACH, CAL., MUN. CODE § 10.54.010–030 (1975). 
93. See, e.g., Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 718 (1982) (brought by a male 
nursing applicant); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 190 (1976) (brought on behalf of men eighteen to 
twenty years old); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 677 (1973) (brought on behalf of women in 
the military on the basis of discriminatory treatment against husband-dependents). 
94. Similar arguments have been made across cultures. Ironically, in places where the  
veil is mandatory, sexual harassment seems to be more prevalent. See Tehran Bureau Chief,  
How the Hijab Has Made Sexual Harassment Worse in Iran, GUARDIAN, Sept. 15, 2015,  
https://www.theguardian.com/world/iran-blog/2015/sep/15/iran-hijab-backfired-sexual-harassment 
[ https://perma.cc/U48A-PXLG] (describing how women in Iran faced increased unwanted sexual 
attention, more akin to “hunting” after the Hijab): 
What is peculiar about Iran, as opposed to other nations in the region, is that it does not 
have a long tradition of requiring women to cover up. In fact, up until 1979 Iranian women 
looked no different than any woman in Europe or America, they could wear mini jupes and 
short dresses, and anecdotally, sexual harassment was not as prevalent as it is today. Fast 
forward thirty years, a generation of men and more have become trained to think of women 
as sexual objects and have lost all sense of self-control. Even, the sight of a woman’s ankle, 
will excite men beyond belief. 
Id. In a post about a brother recounting how his sister’s full hijab invited unwanted sexual attention, 
Josh Shahryar recounts: 
The men who passed us on sidewalks would say demeaning things—things sexual in nature 
that I was too young to understand. My mom and dad wanted me to walk her to school 
because if I wasn’t with her, who knew what these men would do? I grew up hearing stories 
about women being groped, punched, even abducted—all while wearing hijabs. The 
perpetrators were from all ethnic groups and were both Pakistanis and, like us, refugees. 
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A. False Morality 
Despite the differences between nude dancing and female toplessness, the 
government equates the two and posits the same justifications for its prohibitions. 
One argument is to protect public order and morality and to combat sexual violence. 
To date, the Supreme Court has not yet addressed whether it is permissible to 
prohibit toplessness alone (meaning, when it is not in conjunction with dancing) on 
the basis of morality. However, many appellate courts and some state courts have. 
For instance, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals states that: 
The important government interest is the widely recognized one of 
protecting the moral sensibilities of that substantial segment of society that 
still does not want to be exposed willy-nilly to public displays of various 
portions of their fellow citizens’ anatomies that traditionally in this society 
have been regarded as erogenous zones. These still include (whether 
justifiably or not in the eyes of all) the female, but not the male, breast.95 
More recently, an Indiana state court in C.T. v. Indiana applied reasoning from 
the Supreme Court’s First Amendment ruling in Paris Adult Theater96 and the 
Fourth Circuit’s United States v. Biocic to uphold a public nudity statute against an 
Equal Protection challenge.97 The C.T. court reasoned that in the absence of 
authority stating that legislatures can no longer act to preserve order and morality, 
protecting moral sensibilities is still an important justification.98 However, the court 
neglected to consider the Supreme Court’s recent rulings which have questioned 
reliance on morality to justify a discriminatory law.99 
In Barnes, the Court acknowledged that Indiana’s public indecency statute100 
“reflect[s] moral disapproval of people appearing in the nude among strangers in 
 
Josh Shahryar, The Myth of How the Hijab Protects Women Against Sexual Assault, WOMEN’S MEDIA 
CENTER (Sept. 6, 2012), http://www.womenundersiegeproject.org/blog/entry/the-myth-of-how-
the-hijab-protects-women-against-sexual-assault [https://perma.cc/65AP-GJHA]. 
95. United States v. Biocic, 928 F.2d 112, 115–16 (4th Cir. 1999). 
96. See discussion supra Part I.B. 
97. C.T. v. Indiana, 939 N.E.2d 626, 630 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). 
98. Id. at 629. 
99. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
100. The Indiana Statute that was discussed in Barnes, section 35-45-4-1 of the 1988 Indiana 
Code, provides in pertinent part: 
Public indecency; Indecent exposure 
(a) A person who knowingly or intentionally, in a public place: 
(1) engages in sexual intercourse; 
(2) engages in deviate sexual conduct; 
(3) appears in a state of nudity; or 
(4) fondles the genitals of himself or another person; 
commits public indecency, a Class A misdemeanor. 
(b) “Nudity” means the showing of the human male or female genitals, pubic area, or 
buttocks with less than a fully opaque covering, the showing of the female breast with 
less than a fully opaque covering of any part of the nipple, or the showing of covered 
male genitals in a discernibly turgid state. 
IND. CODE. ANN. § 35-45-4-1 (LexisNexis 1988); see also Aaron Brogdon, Improper Application of First-
Amendment Scrutiny to Conduct-Based Public Nudity Laws, Eric v. Pap’s A.M. Perpetuates the Conclusion 
Created by Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 17 BYU J. PUB. L. 89 n.2 (2002). 
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public places.”101 In justifying this conclusion, the Court relied on Bowers v. 
Hardwick, a case where the Court upheld a Georgia statute that criminalized 
sodomy.102 Continued reliance on Bowers, permitting morality as a legitimate 
government interest, is unfounded; this reasoning was explicitly overruled by 
Lawrence v. Texas in 2003:103 
It must be acknowledged, of course, that the Court in Bowers was making 
the broader point that for centuries there have been powerful voices to 
condemn homosexual conduct as immoral. The condemnation has been 
shaped by religious beliefs, conceptions of right and acceptable behavior, 
and respect for the traditional family. For many persons these are not trivial 
concerns but profound and deep convictions accepted as ethical and moral 
principles to which they aspire and which thus determine the course of 
their lives. These considerations do not answer the question before us, 
however. The issue is whether the majority may use the power of the State 
to enforce these views on the whole society through operation of the 
criminal law. “Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate 
our own moral code.”104 
Just as the long history of homophobia masked as morality, this nation has 
applied that same reasoning to its sexist treatment of women’s bodies through its 
laws. Lawrence explicitly questioned the use of one’s morality to justify a 
discriminatory law, yet those in favor of female toplessness bans, such as the Fourth 
Circuit and the Indiana court in C.T., rely on such arguments to ban female 
toplessness.105 The morality, viewed in light of the Court’s previous decisions, is not 
an “exceedingly persuasive justification” for this blatant form of gender 
discrimination. 
As Lawrence noted, the reliance on morality is deeply connected to religion, 
and specifically Judeo-Christian ideologies.106 The explicit use of such ideologies is 
evidenced in a 1980s toplessness case from New York state court, People v. David. 
107 While the case has since been invalidated because a subsequent state court case 
found toplessness laws unconstitutional,108 the reasoning that the David court 
applied has been followed in subsequent cases, such as C.T. In People v. David, Judge 
Regan cited a passage from the Book of Genesis where Adam and Eve both realize 
that they were naked and cover themselves up with fig leaves. He believes the use 
nudity and man’s consciousness of it illustrate man’s knowledge of good and evil 
and that one’s sense of embarrassment from one’s nudity is because nudity is evil 
 
101. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 568 (1991). 
102. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 186 (1986). 
103. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558. 
104. Id. at 571 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992)). 
105. C.T. v. Indiana, 939 N.E.2d 626, 630 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). 
106. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572. 
107. People v. David, 549 N.Y.S.2d 564, 567 (1989), overruled on appeal by 585 N.Y.S.2d 149 
(1991) (overruled on equal protection grounds). 
108. People v. Santorelli, 80 N.Y.2d 875, 883 (1992) (finding New York’s public exposure law 
unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clauses of the federal and state constitutions). 
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and immoral.109 He argues that, “Judeo-Christian morality bans on public nudity” 
are desirable to “reduce the incidence of public misbehavior”110 because, in the 
Judeo-Christian ethic which, according to him, that the United States as a society 
espouses, nudity is a catalyst for shame and immoral behavior and triggers a choice 
between good and evil. 
The use of morality and the Judeo-Christian ethic is illogical not only under its 
own reasoning111 but more importantly as a foundation for a legal judgment. Judge 
Regan assumes that Eve’s breasts were part of the immorality of nudity and that she 
was ashamed to have them exposed,112 but even the most iconic depictions of Adam 
and Eve throughout history show them with fig leaves covering only their genitalia, 
not their chests.113 These celebrated images span centuries and civilizations and 
hang in museums around the world. Many are proudly displayed at some of the 
 
109. Glazer, supra note 58, at 125; David, 549 N.Y.S.2d at 567 (using the following passage from 
Book of Genesis to justify a ruling against several women who were arrested for violating, now repealed, 
New York Penal Law § 245.01): 
So she took some of its fruit and ate it; and she also gave some to her husband, who was 
with her, and he ate it. 
7. Then the eyes of both of them were opened, and they realized that they were naked, so 
they sewed fig leaves together and made loin cloths for themselves. 
8. When they heard the sound of the Lord God moving about in the garden at the breezy 
time of the day, the man and his wife hid themselves from the Lord God among the trees 
of the garden. 
9. The Lord God then called to the man and asked him ”Where are you?” 
10. He answered; I heard you in the garden but I was afraid, because I was naked, so I hid 
myself. 
11. Then the Lord God asked: “Who told you that you were naked?” You have eaten then 
from the tree (of the knowledge of good and evil) of which I had forbidden you to eat!’ 
(Genesis 3:6-11.) 
Id. 
110. David, 549 N.Y.S.2d at 567. 
111. Undergoing the same literal close read of the passage from the Book of Genesis that the 
David court did, it does not follow that nudity in and of itself is evil or immoral, nor does it follow that 
female toplessness “is a catalyst for immoral behavior.” Prior to eating from the Tree of Knowledge, 
Adam and Eve knew right from wrong, good from bad. They were naked before they ate the forbidden 
fruit and did not care. Prior to them eating the fruit, there was nothing immoral about their nudity. The 
“immoral behavior” occurred when Adam and Eve disobeyed instructions and ate the forbidden  
fruit, which they did while they were naked. Moreover, nowhere is shame linked to such immoral 
behavior. Following the logic of Genesis and considering it as truth, it does not follow that God would 
consider the nudity immoral. God intentionally left them naked in the garden in the first place. The 
shame and embarrassment that Adam and Eve felt does not mean that their nudity is “evil.” These are 
natural emotions that most people would feel if they suddenly realized they were completely naked in 
public. Despite Judge Regan’s assumptions to the contrary, The Book of Genesis cannot definitively 
support the notion that God considers a woman’s bare chest immoral. 
112. David, 549 N.Y.S.2d at 567–68. 
113. Even the most iconic ancient depictions of Adam and Eve from various regions show Eve 
topless. See Adam and Eve in Abreha and Atsbeha Church, Ethiopia (circa 210 ACE); Mosaic in 
Monreale Cathedral, Sicily, Italy (twelfth to thirteenth century); Ja´far al-Sādiq, Fālnāmeh (Book of 
Omens), watercolor and gold on paper, Iran (Safavid Dynasty, 16th century); Albrecht Dürer, Adam and 
Eve, engraving, Germany (1504) and Adam and Eve, oil on panel, Germany (1507); Raphael, Adam and 
Eve fresco from Stanza della Segnatura, Vatican (1509-1511); Lucas Cranach the Elder, Adam and Eve 
in Paradise (The Fall), oil on beech wood, Germany (1526); and Titian, The Fall of Man, oil on canvas, 
Italy (1550).  
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world’s holiest sites. It is unlikely that anyone would even consider these images 
immoral because they depict Eve’s bare chest. In fact, even the Fourth Circuit Court 
of Appeals agreed with the notion that “the female breast has from time 
immemorial been the subject of high artistic expression in great, publicly displayed 
sculpture and painting.”114 Even some laws, like the Los Angeles ordinance that 
inspired this Note, have exceptions for depictions of toplessness for artistic 
purposes in certain public spaces.115 Thus, if a woman brought a painting of a 
topless Aphrodite, Venus, or Eve to the beach, she may not violate the law, but if 
she herself was topless, she would violate it. Some may argue that allowing female 
topless sunbathing would cause issues for parents who wish to instill the values of 
modesty in their children who would equate the exposure of topless sunbathers to 
subjecting their child to pornography. This is at best a secondary argument against 
public toplessness, and one that has not been tested by the courts. Although parents 
have the right to control the upbringing, and to some extent education, of their 
children,116 this right is not absolute and should not be a sufficient justification for 
an infringement on a woman’s rights. Furthermore, such claims negate the potential 
important lessons that public toplessness could teach children. For example, the 
very valuable lessons of how to feel comfortable in one’s skin and to normalize the 
human body in its various forms.  
B. Degrading, Demeaning, and Humiliating Reliance on Combating Sexual Violence 
Another argument that proponents rely on is that topless prohibitions are 
necessary to prevent sexual violence. This argument too is invalid because it relies 
on an “overbroad generalization” about men and women and may be more of an 
ad hoc justification for the ban of this form of toplessness. Like the morality 
argument, this explanation is the same one that the court acknowledged in its nude 
dancing cases. In LaRue, the Court upheld the California Department of Alcoholic 
Beverage Control regulation prohibiting nude dancing in establishments licensed to 
sell alcohol as valid under the First Amendment.117 The regulation promulgated by 
the Department only prohibited the “displaying of the pubic hair, anus, vulva, and 
genitals”118 and did not prohibit the displaying of the breast. The Court took note 
of the Department’s “numerous incidents of legitimate concern,” which included 
incidents where: 
 
114. United States v. Biocic, 928 F.2d 112, 116 n.4 (4th Cir. 1999) (agreeing with this point but 
noting that it was irrelevant to the issue of whether intentional exposure of the full female breast in 
public places at the whim of the actor is constitutionally protected). 
115. L.A., CAL., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 17.04.480(C.) (1975). 
116. The Supreme Court repeatedly recognizes parents’ right to control the upbringing of their 
children. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Pierce 
v. Soc’y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). However, such a right 
is not absolute. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (upholding a child labor statute which 
prohibited a young child from soliciting for the Jehovah’s Witnesses at her parent’s direction and stating 
that “the family itself is not beyond regulation in the public interest”).  
117. California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 109 (1972). 
118. Id. at 111–12. 
First to Printer_Alisobhani (Do Not Delete) 8/30/2018  10:41 AM 
2018] FEMALE TOPLESSNESS 317 
Customers were found engaging in oral copulation with women 
entertainers; customers engaged in public masturbation; and customers 
placed rolled currency either directly into the vagina of a female entertainer, 
or on the bar in order that she might pick it up herself . . . . 
Prostitution occurred in and around such licensed premises, and involved 
some of the female dancers. Indecent exposure to young girls, attempted 
rape, rape itself, and assaults on police officers took place on or 
immediately adjacent to such premises.119 
In his dissent, Justice Marshall questioned the veracity of the interest in 
preventing “sex crimes, drug abuse, prostitution, and a wide variety of other 
evils.”120 He noted how they are the “same interests that have been asserted time 
and again before [the] Court as justification for laws banning frank discussion of 
sex and that we have consistently rejected.”121 Additionally, he questioned “the 
empirical link between sex-related entertainment and the criminal activity popularly 
associated” which had “never been proven and, indeed, has now been largely 
discredited.”122 
Nearly all of the incidents that the California Department cited involved 
exposure of the vagina, and not the breast.123 In fact, the Department, noting these 
incidents, felt that it was unnecessary to extend the ban to topless dancing.124 Thus, 
banning innocent, benign, non-sexual toplessness for those same reasons cited 
above is disingenuous. If topless dancing’s “erotic message”125 was not of concern 
for California in LaRue despite those incidents of sexual violence, it is disingenuous 
to use those same incidents to ban benign, innocent, non-sexual toplessness, such 
as sunbathing, swimming, or cooling off. 
The argument that banning toplessness is necessary to combat sexual violence 
sends a degrading message to both men and women and is not an exceedingly 
persuasive justification to condone this prohibition. Just as the Defense of Marriage 
Act and state prohibitions of sodomy and same-sex marriage demeaned, degraded, 
and humiliated our fellow human beings who are homosexual,126 prohibitions of 
female toplessness demean women and degrade men. These laws humiliate men and 
women. They strip every person of his or her humanity. These laws tell women that 
their bodies are obscene, while at the same time telling men that they are unable to 




120. Id. at 131 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
121. Id. (citing REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY 27 
(1970) and Robert B. Cairns, James C.N. Paul & Julius Wishner, Sex Censorship: The Assumptions of 
Anti-Obscenity Laws and the Empirical Evidence, 46 MINN. L. REV. 1009 (1962)). 
122. Id. 
123. Id. at 111. 
124. Id. at 112. 
125. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 560 (1991). 
126. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694 (2013); see also Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 
S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
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These laws further the practice of putting the majority of the burden on 
women to avoid getting sexually harassed and raped,127 rather than encouraging men 
to take an active role128 and teaching men not to harass and assault women.129 By 
forcing a woman not to go topless in public, in fear that it would invite unwanted 
attention, the law is tacitly condoning the bad behavior. 
C. A Breast is a Breast: All Breasts are Erogenous 
Some state courts have concluded that the Equal Protection Clause does not 
prohibit female toplessness laws, reasoning that female breasts are sufficiently 
different than male breasts, as only the former constitute an erogenous zone, and 
that society understands female breasts to be an element of nudity or one’s private 
areas, but not male breasts.130 This is not an important governmental interest in and 
of itself, but it is an argument that has been consistently used to justify this 
discrimination. 
While “nature, not the legislative body, created the distinction between that 
portion of a woman’s body and that of a man’s torso,”131 the legislature and courts 
 
127. Julie Beck, The Different Stakes of Male and Female Birth Control, ATLANTIC, Nov. 1,  
2016, http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2016/11/the-different-stakes-of-male-and-
female-birth-control/506120/ [ https://perma.cc/B7W2-5QWL] (discussing how women have to 
bear the burdens of birth control as opposed to men, especially in light of the discontinuation of the 
trial of male birth control); Tara Culp-Ressler, All of the Things Women Are Supposed to Do to 
Prevent Rape, THINKPROGRESS ( June 10, 2014, 7:50 PM), https://thinkprogress.org/all-of-the-
things-women-are-supposed-to-do-to-prevent-rape-b9365bf520c1#.wx8hvp1sn [ https://perma.cc/ 
QZ7T-S7XS] (a compilation of some of the many sexist and burdensome measures women are 
expected to take to prevent getting raped); Sexual Harassment Policy Office, What You Can Do to Stop 
Sexual Harassment, STAN. U., https://harass.stanford.edu/take-action/what-you-can-do-stop-sexual-
harassment [ https://perma.cc/Z3EV-NUHB] ( last visited June 3, 2018) (guide for students on how 
to stop sexual harassment). 
128. The Pledge, IT’S ON US CAMPAIGN, https://shop.itsonus.org/pages/about-us 
[ https://perma.cc/V54E-8NAP] ( last visited June 3, 2018) (“I pledge [t]o RECOGNIZE that non-
consensual sex is sexual assault[;] [t]o IDENTIFY situations in which sexual assault may occur[;] [t]o 
INTERVENE in situations where consent has not or cannot be given[;] [and] [t]o CREATE an 
environment in which sexual assault is unacceptable and survivors are supported.”); see also Barack 
Obama, Glamour Exclusive: President Barack Obama Says, “This Is What a Feminist Looks Like,” 
GLAMOUR MAG., Aug. 4, 2016, http://www.glamour.com/story/glamour-exclusive-president-barack-
obama-says-this-is-what-a-feminist-looks-like [ https://perma.cc/PU72-RELJ] (“It is absolutely men’s 
responsibility to fight sexism too. And as spouses and partners and boyfriends, we need to work hard 
and be deliberate about creating truly equal relationships.”). 
129. Zerlina Maxwell, Stop Telling Women How to Not Get Raped, EBONY, Jan. 14, 2012,  
http://www.ebony.com/news-views/stop-telling-women-how-to-not-get-raped [ https://perma.cc/ 
Q6B9-JFNA] (“Holding women and girls accountable for preventing sexual assault hasn’t worked and 
so long as men commit the majority of rapes, men need to be at the heart of our tactics for preventing 
them. Let’s stop teaching ‘how to avoid being a victim’ and instead, attack the culture that creates 
predators in the first place.”); see also Larry Harris Jr., Do Not Rape and Teach Your Sons Not to Rape, 
HUFFINGTON POST, Aug. 8, 2016, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/larry-harris-jr/do-not-rape-and-
teach-you_b_11342100.html [https://perma.cc/2BPY-5SCD]. 
130. See generally Kimberly J. Winbush, Annotation, Regulation of Exposure of Female, But Not 
Male, Breasts, 67 A.L.R.5th 431 (1999). 
131. Eckl v. Davis, 51 Cal. App. 3d 831, 848 (1975) (upholding a Los Angeles County public 
nudity ordinance against an Equal Protection challenge on the grounds that the classification was 
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perpetuated it. The distinction is only in the function of the breast: a woman’s 
breasts are made to nourish her young children, whereas a man’s ordinarily are not. 
However, even this may not be the case anymore, as recent studies show that men 
may be able to breastfeed if exposed to enough estrogen.132 Finally, while most laws 
that prohibit female toplessness provide exceptions for breastfeeding,133 the law 
does not address why exposure of the breast to breastfeed is acceptable, where 
exposure for exposure’s sake is not. Both scenarios involve a woman being topless 
in public—a mother breastfeeding in public for convenience or necessity, or a 
woman choosing to go topless to sunbathe or cool off (just like a man could). Even 
if there is no purpose or necessity for removing one’s shirt, the law clearly denies a 
woman this right but grants it to a man without question. 
Recently, a district court in Colorado agreed with this assertion and granted a 
preliminary injunction of the City of Fort Collins’s toplessness ordinance in part 
because it found the City’s argument regarding the inherent physical differences 
between male and female breasts unconvincing. The court reasoned that “while 
inherent physical differences can in some circumstances be a permissible basis for 
differential treatment by the government, . . . that is not the difference between the 
sexes on which [the City’s ordinance] is based.”134 The court noted that based on 
the record, the ordinance was based on the generalized notion that, regardless of a 
woman’s intent, the exposure of her breasts in public (or even in her private home 
if viewable by the public) is necessarily a sexualized act. 
While one may hope that the most recent Free the Nipple case may be an 
indication of how courts may rule in the future, unfortunately, that case is not the 
norm. Courts in California, Indiana, New York, and Washington have blatantly 
ignored science and common logic in favor of society’s unfounded sexist notions.135 
For example, in a 1978 Washington case,136 the court disregarded physician 
testimony (regarding how the breasts have the same composition and are not 
primarily sexual organs, and that the development of the breast is not dictated by 
 
reasonable only because “nudity . . . of women is commonly understood to include the uncovering of 
the breasts.”). Fortunately, Eckl is no longer good law because it applied faulty reasoning and a standard 
of review that gave the benefit of the doubt to the government, a standard that gave the government 
the upper hand and was struck down by the California Supreme Court in Morris v. Mun. Court, 652 
P.2d 51 (Cal. 1982). 
132. Jared Diamond, Father’s Milk, DISCOVER, Feb. 1, 1995, http://discovermagazine.com/ 
1995/feb/fathersmilk468 [ https://perma.cc/76LP-7978]; see also Nikhil Swaminthan, Strange but True: 
Males Can Lactate, SCI. AM., Sept. 6, 2007, https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/strange-but-
true-males-can-lactate/ [https://perma.cc/8UUR-FGU3]. 
133. CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.3 (West 2018) (“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a 
mother may breastfeed her child in any location, public or private, except the private home or residence 
of another, where the mother and the child are otherwise authorized to be present.”). 
134. Free the Nipple—Fort Collins v. City of Fort Collins, 237 F. Supp. 3d 1126, 1132  
(D. Colo. 2017) (citing United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996)). 
135. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 566 (1991); People v. David, 549 N.Y.S.2d 564 
(1989); City of Seattle v. Buchanan, 584 P.2d 918 (1978) (en banc). 
136. Buchanan, 584 P.2d 918 (en banc). 
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gender)137 and instead agreed with the city council’s finding that female but not 
male breasts constitute an erogenous zone and are associated with sexual arousal.138 
The court also ruled that the council had a legitimate goal of encouraging the privacy 
of those body parts used for procreative and reproductive functions.139 
The problem with courts’ conclusions like the one above, that women’s 
breasts can be targeted because they are sexual or erogenous,140 is that they assume 
that men’s breasts cannot be erogenous. However, this is false. Scientists and even 
some courts have acknowledged that the male chest is part of his erogenous zones. 
141 Further, many individuals believe that a man’s chest is his most arousing 
feature.142 However, the courts that have addressed female toplessness have simply 
concluded that there is a difference between a male and female breast, without 
acknowledging this or any other point. 
Justifications for the distinction that a woman’s breasts are erogenous and a 
man’s are not also neglect physiology, which finds few differences between the male 
and female breast.143 As depicted below, the female breast is made up of fat, nipple, 
glands, or alveoli, and a network of ducts through which milk can pass from the 
 
137. Id. at 919–20. 
   The doctor was not asked and did not say whether there is any difference in function 
between the male and female breasts, and we see that the appellants agree that there is such 
a difference. They give it no weight, however, evidently because, as they view the legislative 
intent, function is not an element which the legislative body had in mind when it forbade 
the public exposure of female breasts. 
   We are unable to agree that the legislative body could only have been interested in the 
size or shape of female breasts when it included them among the parts of the human body 
which should not be exposed in public. 
Id. at 920. 
138. Id. at 920. 
139. Id. (“When the legislative intent is viewed in light of the obvious purpose of the ordinance–
to protect the public morals and its concern for the privacy of intimate functions–common knowledge 
tells us, as it undoubtedly told the trial judge, that there is a real difference between the sexes with 
respect to breasts, which is reasonably related to the preservation of public decorum and morals.”). 
140. United States v. Biocic, 928 F.2d 112, 115–16 (4th Cir. 1999) (“The important government 
interest is the widely recognized one of protecting the moral sensibilities of that substantial segment of 
society that still does not want to be exposed willy-nilly to public displays of various portions of their 
fellow citizens’ anatomies that traditionally in this society have been regarded as erogenous zones. These 
still include (whether justifiably or not in the eyes of all) the female, but not the male, breast.”) (citations 
omitted); Craft v. Hodel, 683 F. Supp. 289, 300 (D. Mass. 1988) (upholding NPS regulation barring 
female toplessness and public nudity on the grounds that there are “physical difference between the 
sexes which has implications for the moral and aesthetic sensitivities of a substantial majority of the 
country.”); State v. Vogt, 775 A.2d 551, 558 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (“. . . [It is] not just the 
size of the breast exposed that is at the heart of the male-female distinction. Indeed, while one could 
infer from the photographs admitted at trial some men are more full breasted than some women, it is 
the public sensitivity in the case of women which is at stake.”). See generally Winbush, supra note 130, at 
453–57. 
141. Glazer, supra note 58, at 128. 
142. Id. 
143. Roy Levin & Cindy Meston, Nipple/Breast Stimulation and Sexual Arousal in Young Men 
and Women, 3 J. SEXUAL MED. 450 (2006). 
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glands to the nipples. The glands produce the milk and the ducts transport it.144 
Men’s breasts are also made up of fat, nipple, and ducts. 
 
Figure 1 Male and Female breast compared 
 
The only anatomical difference is that a woman’s breast has “lobes” which contains 
the mammary glands and ducts. Since men actually have the biological scaffold to 
breastfeed, and just have to be exposed to the right hormonal cocktail of 
progesterone, estrogen, oxytocin, and prolactin,145 this is not a true distinction. 
Thus, differences between a man and a woman’s breast are mainly aesthetic and 
socially imposed, which cannot be enough to justify a discriminatory law. 
III. STIGMATIZATION OF WOMEN’S BODIES 
The stigma that women experience as a result of their breasts is uniquely 
female. From the moment their bodies begin to develop, a woman’s body is 
sexualized in a way that a man’s is not. However, the justifications for this are 
 
144. Male and Female Breast, DREAMSTIME.COM, http://thumbs.dreamstime.com/z/male-
female-breast-anatomy-12436234.jpg [ https://perma.cc/SF9S-UMEV] (last visited June 3, 2018). 
145. Thomas H. Kunz & David J. Hosken, Male Lactation: Why, Why Not, and Is It Care?, 24 
TRENDS IN ECOLOGY & EVOLUTION 80 (2009). Additionally, breastfeeding males are not uncommon 
in the animal world; male fruit bats actually breastfeed their newborns. Charles M. Francis et al., Lactation 
in Male Fruit Bats, 367 NATURE 691 (1994). 
First to Printer_Alisobhani (Do Not Delete) 8/30/2018  10:41 AM 
322 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:299 
entirely unfounded. As discussed above, men’s and women’s breasts can both 
experience pleasure, they are made up of the same anatomical structures, and in 
some cases, men’s breasts can be larger than women’s breasts;146 yet only a woman 
is punished for the way society views her breasts. Even where public breastfeeding 
is legal, women are still stigmatized and harassed for feeding their children.147 
Topless prohibitions are only one example of the many ways that the law punishes 
a woman for being a woman. However, it is one of the only areas where the law 
explicitly treats a woman differently than a man. In other areas of law, a woman is 
able to enjoy the same rights as her male counterparts, except when it comes to 
what a woman can do with her body. 
The government may posit that these laws are not a serious deprivation 
because women can show cleavage and wear bikini tops, just as the Court did in 
Barnes.148 However, this trivializes the whole struggle. Women are not able to be 
topless in public because the government deems their breasts obscene and overtly 
sexual. Every day a woman has to cover her breasts is another day when her body 
is deemed lesser than a man’s. Her body is deemed sexual and a man’s is not. 
However, these are all based on heterosexual male-dominated views and do not 
reflect all of society. 
Courts have often relied on traditional societal views to consistently shut 
women out. They used this reasoning to deny Myra Bradwell admission to the 
Illinois Bar,149 and to forbid women from becoming bartenders150 and from 
working the same hours151 and for the same wages152 as men. These rulings may 
have worked 100 years ago, but they cannot persist today. Traditional societal views 
frustrate modern civil rights, including interracial marriage, desegregation of 
schools, and same-sex marriage. These views have very little connection to science 
and modern society. This is the next frontier in the Women’s Movement. Just as 
 
146. Gynecomastia is a condition where the breast tissue of boys and men swell and  
becomes tender. Studies show that about 70% of all boys develop pubertal gynecomastia and up to 
two-thirds of all adult men might have palpable breast tissue on examination. Harmeet S. Narula & 
Harold E. Carlson, Gynaecomastia—Pathophysiology, Diagnosis and Treatment, 10 NATURE REVIEWS 
ENDOCRINOLOGY 684, 684, 688 (2014). 
147. Terri Peters, See How Strangers Awesomely Defend Mom Bullied for Breastfeeding at  
Target, TODAY, June 16, 2016, http://www.today.com/parents/see-how-strangers-awesomely- 
defended-mom-bullied-breastfeeding-target-t98776 [ https://web.archive.org/web/20160617133421/ 
https://www.today.com/parents/see-how-strangers-awesomely-defended-mom-bullied-breastfeeding- 
target-t98776] (a video of a woman being verbally assaulted by a man for breastfeeding her four-week 
old daughter in a Connecticut Target. Before the video started, the man apparently told the woman: 
“Can’t you do that somewhere else? . . . That’s fucking disgusting. . . . You are nasty . . . you are fucking 
disgusting . . . you are fucking disgusting . . . you are fucking disgusting . . . you whore”). 
148. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 587 (1991) (Souter, J., concurring) (“Pasties 
and a G-string moderate the expression to some degree, to be sure, but only to a degree. Dropping the 
final stitch is prohibited, but the limitation is minor when measured against the dancer’s remaining 
capacity and opportunity to express the erotic message.”). 
149. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 130 (1873). 
150. Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 464 (1948). 
151. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908). 
152. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (overturning Adkins v. Children’s 
Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923), and declaring the federal minimum wage legislation for women was an 
unconstitutional infringement of liberty of contract). 
First to Printer_Alisobhani (Do Not Delete) 8/30/2018  10:41 AM 
2018] FEMALE TOPLESSNESS 323 
the Women’s Movement of the 1960s and 1970s exposed the discrimination and 
harassment women faced in the workforce, it is time to expose the discrimination 
and harassment imposed on women’s bodies by our laws. Women are making gains 
in all aspects of life: they dominate universities and post-graduate programs; they 
are in board rooms and court rooms; they can be Supreme Court justices and even 
Presidential nominees, and one day soon, Presidents. Yet, despite all of these gains, 
a woman’s body is still legally and socially treated as a sexual object, subservient to 
a man’s. 
Additionally, these laws can have other ramifications such as criminal or 
professional punishments. A woman who chose to sunbathe topless in a jurisdiction 
with a prohibition may have a criminal record for doing something that would be 
perfectly legal as a man. In most cases the woman would get a misdemeanor and be 
jailed or fined, making women criminals for doing something that a man can do 
legally. 
Women can find the sight of man’s chest erotic and some men can also 
get aroused from breast and nipple stimulation.153 However, men do not experience 
the same treatment as women with regards to their chest. As Reena Glazer 
eloquently notes: 
The (heterosexual) male myth of a woman’s breast has been codified into 
law. Because women are the sexual objects and property of men, it follows 
that what might arouse men can only be displayed when men want to be 
aroused … . No consideration [is] given to contexts in which women 
might enjoy going topless for their own reasons, regardless of any effect 
on male viewers. Nor [is] any consideration given to the fact that women 
might not be bothered by the sight of other women’s breasts.154 
Unfortunately, this “myth” has also sexualized women at the first signs of 
development. At a young age, girls are taught to self-objectify; by middle school, 
many are already confronted with the reality that they are sexual objects.155 The 
reality that girls and women face is not rooted in anything but social views of what 
is sexually appealing.156 Because this perspective gives no consideration for other 
benign uses of being topless, many can never divorce the sight of a topless woman 
from something of sexual pleasure. It is no wonder why many laws are justified on 
the basis of offending other people. For instance, in many cases, these laws were 
designed to protect non-consenting viewers. The ordinance in Newport Beach for 
example was passed for this exact purpose,157 to expressly codify the view that a 
 
153. Levin & Meston, supra note 143. 
154. Glazer, supra note 58, at 116–17. 
155. Marinda Valenti, What Do Dress Codes Say About Girls’ Bodies, MS. MAG. BLOG (May 
24, 2013), http://msmagazine.com/blog/2013/05/24/what-do-dress-codes-say-about-girls-bodies/ 
[ https://perma.cc/2DV5-8Q3D]. 
156. Id.; see also Milstead, supra note 45, at 282 (“Our court is not authorized, however, to take 
judicial notice of the concept that the breasts of female topless dancers, unlike their male counterparts, 
are commonly associated with sexual arousal. Such a viewpoint might be subject to reasonable dispute, 
depending on the sex and sexual orientation of the viewer.” (citing Williams v. City of Fort Worth, 782 
S.W.2d 290, 297 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989))). 
157.  NEWPORT BEACH, CAL., MUN. CODE ch. 10.54 (1996) (The City Council finds that it is 
both in the public interest and necessary to protect and promote the public health, safety and welfare 
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woman’s breasts are offensive and obscene sends a message to women that their 
bodies are obscene. 
IV. FEMALE TOPLESSNESS CAN GAIN SOCIAL ACCEPTANCE 
There are many instances throughout the civil rights and women’s 
movements where the status quo needed to change in order for society to progress, 
and this is one of them. Until 1967, the status quo in many parts of the country was 
that interracial marriage was forbidden.158 The Supreme Court declared that ban 
unconstitutional, and today, no one would consider such a marriage anything but a 
joyous union between two individuals who love each other.159 Until 1975, it was 
common for states to exclude women from jury service,160 and yet today, men and 
women throughout the country all get to share the pleasure of being called for (and 
trying to avoid) jury duty. Until 1984, it was common for many law firms to 
discriminate on the basis of sex in promoting lawyers to the partnership;161 such a 
thing could never overtly happen today. Until 1996, many women were unable to 
attend the same military universities as men,162 and now women make up at about 
20 percent of the graduating classes of the nation’s most prestigious military 
universities.163 More recently, until late 2015, women were not able to hold the same 
combat positions as men,164 but now they are. The de-stigmatization of women’s 
 
and that said parks, playgrounds and beaches be utilized and enjoyed by as many persons as possible; 
that maximum utilization and enjoyment of said parks, playgrounds and beaches can only be obtained 
through imposition of regulations regarding activities thereon; the periods of some persons utilizing said 
parks, playgrounds and beaches by appearing thereon without clothing and with the private parts of 
their bodies exposed, unreasonably interferes with the rights of all persons to use and enjoy said parks, 
playgrounds and beaches by causing many persons to leave and others not to use said parks, 
playgrounds and beaches; . . . that the presence of persons who are unclothed and exposed to public 
view in or on public rights-of-way, parks, playgrounds and beaches, or on any private property open to 
public view from public parks, playgrounds, beaches or other public ways tends to discourage the use and 
enjoyment of said public parks, playgrounds, beaches and public ways of the City, and creates a nuisance 
and is offensive to members of the public who wish to use and enjoy said public parks, playgrounds, 
beaches and places and who are unwillingly exposed to such conduct) (emphasis added); see also Barnes  
v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 560 (1991). 
158. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
159. Id. 
160. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 522 (1975). 
161. Hishon v. King & Spaulding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984). 
162. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 515 (1996). 
163. The 2015 graduating class of the Naval Academy had 204 female students out  
of 1070 students, and the 2016 graduating class of the Air Force Academy had 182 female students out 
of 812 students. Class of 2015 Statistics, U.S. NAVAL ACADEMY (May 22 2015 8:19 AM), 
https://www.usna.edu/NewsCenter/2015/05/class-of-2015-statistics.php [ https://perma.cc/X5MJ-
YWEH]; U.S. Air Force Acad. Pub. Affairs, Academy Releases Class of ‘16 Stats, U.S. AIR FORCE  
ACAD. ( June 1, 2016), http://www.usafa.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/788557/academy-
releases-class-of-16-stats/ [ https://perma.cc/37LT-4BCP]. Unfortunately, VMI still has quite a way to 
go; in 2015, VMI had 183 female students, out of a student body of 1717. Common Data Set: Fall 2016,  
VA. MIL. INST., http://www.vmi.edu/media/content-assets/documents/assessment/CDS_2016-
2017.pdf [ https://perma.cc/7YG8-KDM5] ( last visited June 3, 2018). 
164. Dep’t of Def., Secretary of Defense Ash Carter Opens All Jobs to Women - 12/3/2015, 
YOUTUBE (Dec. 3, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8d3cI_Kcgwk; see also Bill Chappell, 
Pentagon Says Women Can Now Serve in Front-Line Ground Combat Positions, NPR, Dec. 3, 2015,  
http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2015/12/03/458319524/pentagon-will-allow-women-in-
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bodies vis-à-vis female toplessness is the next frontier. If the military, which is 
generally slow to react to social changes,165 is finally able to acknowledge that a 
woman is equal to a man in combat and education, and possibly the draft,166 the 
rest of society needs to catch up. 
A. Pushing the Limits 
Societal pressures on women to look a certain way are nearly universal.167 
This pressure is applied through laws and social norms. Society also imposes cruel 
and harsh punishments on a woman who does not fit this model—if she shows too 
much skin, she is “asking for it,” or is called awful names. Society has expected 
women to be chaste and modest. However, throughout history there are instances 
where women tried to break this mold simply by changing what they wore when 
they went to the beach or out in the town. For example, in 1907, Annette Kellerman, 
an Australian swimmer, was arrested for wearing a fitted, sleeveless bathing suit in 
Boston.168 A famous image by the National Photo Company shows a Washington 
D.C. swimsuit policeman measuring the distance between women’s knees and 
bathing suits in 1922, when at that time the rule was that suits could not be over six 
inches above the knee.169 Today, women can wear anything they want at the beach, 





165. For example, the military only recently repealed Don’t Ask Don’t Tell. DON’T ASK  
DON’T TELL REPEAL ACT OF 2010, 111 Pub. L. 321, 124 Stat. 3515 (Enacted Dec. 22, 2010); see also 
CLIFFORD L. STANLEY, MEMORANDUM RE: REPEAL OF “DON’T ASK, DON’T TELL,” (2011),  
http://archive.defense.gov/home/features/2010/0610_dadt/USD-PR-DADT_Repeal_Day_Memo_ 
20Sep.pdf [ https://perma.cc/DK98-T8JV]; Elisabeth Bumiller, Obama Ends ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’ 
Policy, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/23/us/23military.html 
[https://web.archive.org/web/20180510083232/https://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/23/us/ 
23military.html ]. 
166. As this Note was written, President Obama announced that he would be willing to open 
the draft to women. See Josh Lederman, Obama Administration Supports Requiring Women to Register 
for Military Draft, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 1, 2016, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/
white-house-announces-support-women-military-draft/ [https://perma.cc/PBL2-BNBW]. 
167. Across the globe, there are accounts of widespread pressure to look good. See PARDIS 
MAHDAVI, PASSIONATE UPRISINGS: IRAN’S SEXUAL REVOLUTION 31, 134 (2009); ANGELA  
B. MCCRACKEN, THE BEAUTY TRADE: YOUTH, GENDER, AND FASHION GLOBALIZATION (2014); 
Susanne Helfert & Petra Warschburger, The Face of Appearance-Related Social Pressure: Gender, Age 
and Body Mass Variations in Peer and Parental Pressure During Adolescence, CHILD & ADOLESCENT 
PSYCHIATRY & MENTAL HEALTH, May 2013. 
168. It was seen as acceptable in Australia, but prohibited in the United States. See Kristin 




169. Swimsuit Police Check the Length of Swimmers’ Ensembles in Amazing Re-colorized 1922 
Photo, THE HUFFINGTON POST, Aug. 6, 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/06/
swimsuit-police_n_3713153.html [https://perma.cc/SA5X-X364]. 
170. A monokini is a swimsuit which consists of only a close fitting bottom. It was first created 
in 1964 by Rudi Gernreich, and the initial versions consisted of a brief that went from the upper thigh 
to the midriff and had two thin straps that tied around the neck. Modern ones are much simpler, and 
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If female toplessness was as legal in this country as male toplessness is, it 
would eventually gain social acceptance just as male toplessness did eighty years ago. 
Today, men are free to expose their chests in public with “no consideration of the 
impact on possible views.”171 However, until the 1930s, male toplessness was 
banned in most parts of the country for the same reasons women’s toplessness is 
today. In 1936, Westchester, New York became one of the first cities to permit male 
toplessness at the beach.172 Only two years before, eight men were fined $1 for 
being topless at Coney Island beach. In condoning the men, the presiding 
magistrate, exhibiting a similar objectifying tone when discussing the men’s body, 
said: “All of you fellows may be Adonises but there are many people who object to 
seeing so much of the human body exposed.” In 1935, forty-two men were arrested 
for being topless in Atlantic City and were fined $84. The city fathers referred to 
the men as “gorillas.” Now, no one refers to a topless man as an animal; no one 
refers to a topless man as anything besides someone dressed appropriately for the 
beach. It did not take long for male toplessness to gain social acceptance and 
popularity. Three years after the Atlantic City incident, Life Magazine published 
images of various male topless beachgoers of various ages and donning different 
styles of “the topless suit.”173 Rather than calling the men “gorillas,” the article 
changed its tone and simply provides the caption below. 
 
resemble a bikini bottom. See Eleanor Nanble, Topless Swimsuit Causes Commotion, CHI. TRIB., June 10, 
1964. 
171. Glazer, supra note 58, at 116. 
172. Irving Wallace et al., Men Arrested for Topless Bathing, READING EAGLE PARADE, Oct. 3, 
1982, at 19. 
173.  Men Now Bathe Topless on Many Public Beaches, LIFE MAG., July 18, 1938. 
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Society has proven willing to grow and adapt with the times as it did with 
male toplessness. Society will change and progress as it has done in many other 
areas.174 It just needs to be given the opportunity to do so. 
B. Using Media to Normalize Breasts 
Covered or not, breasts make a woman an instant target for unwanted 
attention. Part of the reason for this is that, through depictions of women’s bodies 
in media, people have grown accustomed to associating a woman’s breasts with 
something overtly sexual and objectified. It is no wonder why society expects men 
to act like barbarians at the sight of a breast, because society has essentially trained 
men to associate the sight of a woman’s breast as something purely sexual.175 
The best way to stop propagating this conditioning of men is by 
normalizing female toplessness in reality. The significance of the growing depictions 
of women’s bodies and breasts in television and film is twofold. On the one hand, 
as mentioned above, the depictions have likely increased men’s view of women as 
either sexual objects, reproductive, or maternal figures; but on the other, society is 
also growing more used to seeing women’s breasts. No one could forget what 
happened to Janet Jackson during the 2004 Superbowl Halftime Show and how 
CBS was not only fined, but Jackson herself was the subject of Congressional 
hearings and had her reputation tarnished.176 But over ten years later, the Halftime 
show incident has largely become a thing of the past. Today, toplessness is not as 
taboo as it once was. Even the popular television show Modern Family poked fun 
at America’s prudishness in an episode where the family goes on a vacation to 
 
174. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 1 (1967); 
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2584 (2015). 
175. L. Monique Ward, Ann Merriwether & Allison Caruthers, Breasts Are for Men: Media, 
Masculinity Ideologies, and Men’s Beliefs About Women’s Bodies, 9 SEX ROLES 55 (2006). 
176. See Milstead, supra note 45, at 273. 
First to Printer_Alisobhani (Do Not Delete) 8/30/2018  10:41 AM 
328 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:299 
Australia and the two teenage boy characters are searching for topless sunbathers. 
According to the episode’s synopsis on ABC, while on their Australian vacation 
Luke and Manny, the two teenaged boys in the series, want to see “boobs at topless 
Bondi Beach.”177 When the boys finally do see a topless sunbather, Luke is so 
spooked that he loses his swimming trunks in the ocean, and a topless swimmer 
helps him find them. The joke of the episode was that the boys were “searching” 
for topless sunbathers, only to be spooked once they finally saw one. Surprisingly, 
many of the reviews of the episode barely even mentioned that scene. This is one 
of the most popular shows on television; if it can normalize toplessness in other 
countries without any significant backlash, then perhaps through similar depictions, 
the American people will grow more accustomed to it. 
CONCLUSION 
For decades, women have tried to address this issue through the political 
process and have not been successful. While some state courts were strong allies for 
this movement in the 1980s and 1990s, there were also many who further damaged 
the movement. In the 1980s and 1990s there have been a few successful state court 
decisions in New York and California regarding topless dancing. Since 2014, there 
have been numerous protests regarding female toplessness but legal efforts have 
largely halted since the early 1990s, with the exception of the most recent failed 
attempt of Sonoko Tagami in Illinois178 and the successful Equal Protection 
challenge by Free the Nipple.179 The most recent district court decision is promising; 
however, there is a long way to go. 
The fact that a woman cannot go topless in public in most states and cities 
in this country is indicative of a larger problem with the treatment of women in our 
society, which affects all women, regardless of age, race, or sexual identity, and 
whether they would choose to go topless. Repealing these laws is about ensuring 
that a woman can stand on equal footing under the law to a man. It is about ensuring 
that if a woman is required to give up a part of her freedom, that it is justified and 
based on sound logic, and not the remnants of antiquated social norms. The Equal 
Protection Clause ensures that inherent differences do not allow for discriminatory 
treatment under the law. The issues that female toplessness raises are indicative of 
the greater problem of the way the law treats women. In order to get true equality 
under the law for women, the law needs to view a woman and her body as equal to 
 
177. Modern Family, Australia, Season 5 Episode 20 (Apr. 23, 2014). 
178. Sonoko Tagami v. City of Chicago, No. 14 cv 9074 (E.D. Ill. 2015). For a discussion about 
some of the recent social movements behind female toplessness, see Take Two,  
Should it Be Legal for Women to Go Topless in Public? (Poll), 89.3KPCC, Sept. 26, 2013,  
http://www.scpr.org/programs/take-two/2013/09/26/33923/should-it-be-legal-for-women-to-go-
topless-in-publ/ [https://perma.cc/N2R5-JT5U], and Jessica Blankenship, The Social and  
Legal Arguments for Allowing Women to Go Topless in Public, ATLANTIC, Sept. 18, 2013,  
http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/09/the-social-and-legal-arguments-for-allowing-
women-to-go-topless-in-public/279755/ [https://perma.cc/7BLU-D3EC]. 
179. Free the Nipple—Fort Collins v. City of Fort Collins, 237 F. Supp. 3d 1126, 1126, 1130–
33 (D. Colo. 2017) (holding that the factors for a preliminary injunction weigh heavily in plaintiff’s 
favor because the City’s justifications for the ban, namely, preserving morality, maintaining public 
order, and protecting children, and the differences between the male and female breast are not sufficient 
to justify the City’s gender-based discrimination). 
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a man’s. A woman’s body is her vessel, just like a man’s is his. If the law cannot treat 
this fundamental part of her as equal to her male counterparts, she will not be able 
to expect the law to treat her equally in other ways. This is the first step in the long 
fight for true equity. 
 
